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Can You Keep a Secret?:
Some Wish to Ban Encryption Technology for
Fears of Data "Going Dark"
Steven B. Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
A national debate is growing over the widespread distribution and use of
unbreakable encryption technology in consumer electronics. In the interest of
law enforcement and national security, some governmental officials have
pushed to regulate against such technology to prevent data from "going
dark."' Those concerned with individual privacy, on the other hand, welcome
encryption and oppose government interference with its use and distribution.2
This group includes large technology companies that have additional inter-
ests in maintaining customer satisfaction and sales figures.3 These well-
funded companies are poised to battle legal opponents that attempt to en-
croach on their efforts to secure privacy.4
Compounding the debate are recent exposures of seemingly unconstitu-
tional government programs that target U.S. citizens in bulk data collection
and mass surveillance efforts. Against this backdrop, tension has grown be-
tween the competing interests. This comment explores several constitutional
and prudential challenges posed by proposals to stifle the use of encryption.
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government offi-
cials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
* Steven B. Taylor is a J.D. candidate scheduled to graduate from the SMU
Dedman School of Law in May 2017. Steven would like to thank Professor
Jeffrey for delivering inspiring lectures and for guidance during the preparation
of this comment. Steven would also like to thank his amazing wife, Kelli, for
encouraging him and making it possible for him to focus.
I. See James B. Comey, Dir., Fed, Bureau of Investigation, Going Dark: Are
Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Keynote Ad-
dress as the Brookings Institute (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-
course.
2. See Steven Morgan, Apple's CEO on Encryption: "You Can't Have a Back
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contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto him-
self; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that per-
nicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.5
II. HISTORY OF THE ISSUE
A. Government Privacy Infringements Lead to the Widespread Use
of Strong Encryption
In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency
(NSA) contractor leaked classified documents revealing NSA surveillance of
American telephone records pursuant to the § 215 of the Patriot Act.6 Among
the leaked documents was an order from a secret court authorized under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008; the
order required Verizon, on an "ongoing, daily basis," to provide the govern-
ment with information on all telephone calls, and it forbade Verizon's disclo-
sure of the order.7 The document shows that "under the Obama
administration the communication records of millions of US citizens are be-
ing collected indiscriminately and in bulk-regardless of whether they are
suspected of any wrongdoing."8
Days later, news outlets reported that the NSA had "obtained direct ac-
cess to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple and other US internet gi-
ants."9 Through PRISM, a previously undisclosed program, NSA officials
gained direct access to company servers in order to "collect material includ-
ing search history, the content of emails, file transfers and live chats."o
The Protect America Act of 2007 initially enabled the NSA surveillance
program by making changes to applicable U.S. surveillance laws.11 Congress
5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Cus-
tomers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguar
dian.com/world/2013/j un/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; see Emma





9. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
10. Id.
11. See Protect America Act, S. 1927, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted).
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reauthorized the applicable changes through the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 and renewed the changes in December 2012.12 These statutes allow "the
targeting of any customers of participating firms who live outside the US, or
those Americans whose communications include people outside the US."l3
The statutes also create the possibility of warrantless collection of communi-
cations made entirely within the United States.14 Under these statutes, the
NSA developed PRISM to facilitate "extensive, in-depth surveillance on live
communications and stored information."15
"These reports spoke to, and helped add fuel to, concerns among interest
groups and a significant percentage of the public about perceived govern-
ment abuses of privacy."16 Suddenly, privacy became a mainstream topic in
the conversations of ordinary citizens. Through what is now referred to as the
"Snowden effect," U.S. citizens began to reevaluate the security of their pri-
vate data and communications.17
B. Technology Companies Respond by Providing Strong Encryption
to Allow Customers to "Go Dark"
Suspicion from other nations and privacy demands from their customers
created market pressures that motivated both Apple and Google to enable
strong encryption as the default setting for their mobile handheld devices.18
Encryption is the process of converting readily discernable information into a
format that is unrecognizable unless the reader has some secret information




16. Jason M. Weinstein et al., Privacy vs. Public Safety: Prosecuting and Defend-
ing Criminal Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 729, 730
(2015); see, e.g., David E. Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling Post-Snowden
Era, New iPhone Locks Out N.S.A., N.Y. TiMEs, Sep. 26, 2014, at Al, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-
a-post-snowden-era-.html ("At Apple and Google, company executives say the
United States government brought these changes on itself. The revelations by
the former N.S.A. contractor Edward J. Snowden not only killed recent efforts
to expand the law, but also made nations around the world suspicious that
every piece of American hardware and software-from phones to servers made
by Cisco Systems-have 'back doors' for American intelligence and law
enforcement.").
17. See Trevor Timm, The Snowden Effect: New Privacy Wins Await After Data
Transfer Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/08/snowden-effect-new-privacy-wins-
data-transfer-ruling.
18. Comey, supra note 1.
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that allows deciphering of the message.1 9 A more commonly known, simplis-
tic form of encrypted messages are cryptograms found in entertainment sec-
tions of newspapers. Deciphering newspaper cryptograms is a relatively easy
task, but the methods used in computer encryption have become increasingly
complex. These complex encryption methods have made deciphering practi-
cally impossible without complete knowledge of the secret encrypting
method.20 Deciphering encrypted information to the original format (e.g.,
video files, images, or simple messages) usually requires both knowledge of
the encrypting method (publicly known) and knowledge of a piece of infor-
mation called a key-often an extraordinarily large, random number that is
kept private.21 The encryption methods used by Apple and Google are un-
breakable (i.e. Strong Encryption); even the companies themselves cannot
decipher the information.
In October 2015, Apple explained to a federal judge in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York that the company would be incapable of accessing data in
devices running its newest operating system (iOS 8).22 Apple explained,
"[t]hose devices include a feature that prevents anyone without the device's
passcode from accessing its data, including Apple itself."23 The feature was
adopted in 2014 amid "heightened privacy concerns following leaks by for-
mer National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden about NSA sur-
veillance programs."24
C. The Threat of "Going Dark" Has Prompted FBI Director Comey
to Propose Banning Its Distribution
Law enforcement officials, accustomed to having limitless data access,
are frustrated by hindrances to investigations resulting from the inability to
access encrypted data; this problem is known as "going dark." FBI Director,
James Comey, gave a speech at the Brookings Institute in October 2014 call-
ing for legislation to compel the "assistance and cooperation" from technol-
ogy companies in law enforcement investigations.25 He proposed legislation
19. What is Encryption, and Why Are People Afraid of It?, How-To GEEK, http://
www.howtogeek.com/234642/what-is-encryption-and-why-are-people-afraid-
of-it/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Apple Inc. Response to Court's October 9, 2015 Memorandum and Order,
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search War-
rant Issued by this Court, No. 15-MS-1902 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), ECF No. 11.
23. Nate Raymond, Apple Tells U.S. Judge 'Impossible' to Unlock New iPhones,
REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-court-en
cryption-idUSKCNOSE2NF20151020.
24. Id.
25. See Comey, supra note 1.
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that would require companies to create products with a "front door" (as op-
posed to a "back door") key. The key would be held or accessible by govern-
ment officials and available for use only after proper judicial review. It
would allow officials to search the contents of seized, encrypted informa-
tion.26 The aim is to prevent information from "going dark" by proscribing
the distribution of unbreakable encryption.
Director Comey classified two types of data: "data at rest" and "data in
motion." Data at rest describes information stored on devices27 and is usually
encrypted through some variation of the conventional method described
above.28 In contrast, data in motion is information sent through a network
(e.g., a text message sent through a wireless carrier network). 29 This type of
data is vulnerable to interception before reaching its recipient. Accordingly,
data in motion is usually encrypted before leaving the originator's device.
The method used is often a more complex version of encryption called pub-
lic-key cryptography, which involves the use of multiple keys. 30 Under Di-
rector Comey's plan, technology companies would likely provide
cryptography in which the company also holds an additional key to both data
at rest and data in motion.
D. Technology Companies Actively Support Strong Encryption
Technology industry leaders are prepared to oppose efforts aimed at dis-
abling privacy-enabling encryption. Speaking at WSJDLive in October 2015,
Apple CEO, Tim Cook, said, "I don't know a way to protect people without
encrypting."31 He further added, "You can't have a back door that's only for
the good guys." 32 The Information Technology Industry Council (ITI)-
members include Apple, Dell, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. How PGP Works, THE INT'L PGP HOME PAGE, http://www.pgpi.org/doc/pgpin
trol (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
29. See id.
30. Id. ("The primary benefit of public key cryptography [over the conventional
method described above] is that it allows people who have no preexisting se-
curity arrangement to exchange messages securely." Public key cryptography
involves the use of two keys: a public key known to all and a private key
known only to the recipient. The two keys are mathematically related in a way
that is too complicated for even the most powerful computers to discern. That
relationship, however, allows a message encrypted with the publicly known
key to be decrypted only with knowledge of the private key. This method is
increasingly becoming more common for networked communications.). Id.
31. Morgan, supra note 2.
32. Id.
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Twitter-speaks globally for the technology sector. 33 ITI sent a letter to Pres-
ident Obama on June 8, 2015 that urged him to refrain from pursuing "any
policy or proposal that would require or encourage companies to weaken
[encryption]." 34 On November 19, 2015, ITI President and CEO, Dean Gar-
field, released the following statement:
Encryption is a security tool we rely on every day to stop
criminals from draining our bank accounts, to shield our cars and
airplanes from being taken over by malicious hacks, and to other-
wise preserve our security and safety. We deeply appreciate law
enforcement's and the national security community's work to pro-
tect us, but weakening encryption or creating backdoors to en-
crypted devices and data for use by the good guys would actually
create vulnerabilities to be exploited by the bad guys, which
would almost certainly cause serious physical and financial harm
across our society and our economy. Weakening security with the
aim of advancing security simply does not make sense. 35
In addition to the technology industry, equally important pushbacks
have come from various security branches of the U.S. government. Speaking
to the Atlantic Counsel in January 2016, NSA Director, Admiral Michael S.
Rogers, said, "encryption is foundational to the future."36 To quibble that
"encryption is bad and we ought to do away with it [is] a waste of time."37
Rather, the more important question is, "what's the best way for [security
officials] to deal with it?"38 "General Michael Hayden, former director of
both the CIA (2006 to 2009) and the NSA (1999 to 2005) says FBI Director
James Comey is wrong about encryption, and that America and the American
people will be 'more secure' with unbreakable, end-to-end encryption."39
The statements reflect the growing tension over the debate.
33. Id.
34. Tech Industry Warns President of Risks in Compromising Encryption, INFO.
TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL (June 9, 2015), http://www.itic.org/news-events/news-
releases/tech-industry-warns-president-of-risks-in-compromising-encryption.
35. Tech Responds to Calls to Weaken Encryption, INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL
(Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.itic.org/news-events/news-releases/tech-responds
-to-calls-to-weaken-encryption.
36. Michael S. Rogers, Dir., Nat'l Sec. Agency, U.S. Cybercom and the NSA: A




39. Bryan Chaffin, Former Director of CIA and NSA Says FBI Is Wrong About





In February 2016, tensions grew even stronger between technology
companies and the U.S. government when a U.S. District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California ordered Apple, Inc. to unlock an encrypted
iPhone.40 At the request of the FBI, and under the authority of the All Writs
Act of 1789, the Magistrate Judge ordered Apple to build "a version of iOS
that bypasses security [in a way that] would undeniably create a backdoor."41
Intending to oppose the order, Apple warned, "while the government may
argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee
such control."42 Apple cited privacy as its guiding concern:
The implications of the government's demands are chilling. If the
government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock
your iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone's de-
vice to capture their data. The government could extend this
breach of privacy and demand that Apple build surveillance
software to intercept your messages, access your health records or
financial data, track your location, or even access your phone's
microphone or camera without your knowledge.43
The order, described by Apple as "unprecedented," comes under unusu-
ally compelling circumstances.44 The iPhone targeted by the order was used
by Syed Rizwan Farook, the terrorist who "carried out the San Bernardino
shootings that killed 14 people and wounded 22 others at a holiday party."45
The shooting had a "large emotional impact while also demonstrating the
danger posed by armed militants."46 More compelling, the iPhone's owner is
Farook's former employer, a local government that consents to the search of
the phone.47 These sympathetic facts make a strong case in favor of the un-
precedented order.48
Unsurprisingly, the order and Apple's public response have heightened
the attention U.S. news media circles are giving to the encryption debate. The
40. See David Ingram & Dan Levine, Apple Likely to Invoke Free-speech Rights in
Encryption Fight, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016, 1:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-apple-encryption-freespeech-idUSKCNOVSO25.
41. What is Encryption, and Why Are People Afraid of It?, How-To GEEK, http://
www.howtogeek.com/234642/what-is-encryption-and-why-are-people-afraid-
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topic has even spread into the 2016 Presidential race. 49 Candidates, usually
careful to avoid commitment, face direct questions regarding the issue, and
their various positions are not easily categorized along party lines.so But can-
didates who take a strong stance risk being labeled anti-privacy or pro-
terrorist.
Proponents of Director Comey's plan essentially describe the problem
as a classic case of merely balancing the "friction between individual liberty
and collective security."51 The thrust of their argument is that the pervasive
use of encryption-"going dark"-"creates an unacceptable obstacle to law-
ful searches and surveillance that are necessary to protect the public from
criminal and national security threats."52 They argue that, when reasonable,
the Fourth Amendment authorizes governmental search and surveillance,53
but the use of encryption acts as an absolute restriction on this vested govern-
mental right. But does it? Does the right to search and surveil include the
power to compel all citizens to communicate and record information in a way
such that their words can be heard and their actions be seen? Does the inter-
est in searching and surveilling empower Congress, the President, or the
Courts to place burdens upon those who seek to preserve privacy? May they
forbid whispering?
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Proponents have tailored the plan to ban the distribution of encryption to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment's purpose without violating its black-let-
ter text. At first glance, the plan appears to suggest clever means of aiding
law enforcement and national security officials without violating the techni-
calities of the Constitution. But a more careful examination suggests
otherwise.
Notwithstanding the aim of the Comey plan, it likely still violates the
Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The plan also likely violates the fundamental right to privacy. Even
worse, these violations may not be redressable. Accordingly, this analysis
begins with a discussion of standing requirements.
49. See Michael Morisy, Where Do the Presidential Candidates Stand on Encryp-
tion?, WINDOws IT PRO (Feb. 18, 2016), http://windowsitpro.com/security/
where-do-presidential-candidates-stand-encryption.
50. See id.
51. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Averting the Inherent Dangers of "Going Dark": Why
Congress Must Require A Locked Front Door to Encrypted Data, 72 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1433 (2015).




A. If a Legislative Ban on the Distribution of Strong Encryption Is
Unconstitutional, Abuse Is Likely Not Redressable
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ."54 FBI Director
Comey calls for tailoring legislation in such a way as to defeat the Fourth
Amendment's purpose without violating the specific requirements typically
at issue in Fourth Amendment cases and controversies.
To circumvent the Fourth Amendment, Congress would ban technology
companies (e.g., Apple and Google) from distributing strong encryption ca-
pabilities. These companies would be required to maintain access to all the
devices they sell. With a search warrant, the government could compel com-
panies to provide access to information contained on any device. Thus, the
potential legislation would essentially conscript technology companies to
seize information so the government could then search the information after a
court's approval. Such a situation would be similar to the leaked HSA court
order allowing the search of Verizon's U.S. customers' phone records.55
While this legislation seems tentatively permissible, it still begs the
question: is it constitutional? In 2013, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
asked a similar question.56 In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held the
complaining party did not have standing to sue. 5 7 Ordinarily, if legislation
oversteps the constitutional limits of congressional authority, Article III
Courts can strike down the legislation.58 Authority to do so, however, is lim-
ited to actual cases and controversies.5 9 "One element of the case-or-contro-
versy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to
sue."60 Standing requires an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and ac-
tual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by
a favorable ruling."61 After establishing standing, the case can move on to
discovery where the parties have the ability to ascertain the evidence neces-
sary to prove their case.62
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
55. See Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 9.
56. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013).
57. Id. at 1142-43.
58. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
60. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
61. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).
62. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 906 (1990).
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Where the injury is an invasion of privacy, showing injury, whether
actual or imminent, proves to be prohibitively difficult,63 and "[a]ll too often
the invasion of privacy itself will go unknown." 64 This was the case in Am-
nesty International,65 in which the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of a 2008 amendment to FISA that "established a new and independent
source of intelligence collection authority, beyond that granted in traditional
FISA."66 The amendment removed the requirement that the government must
"demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power."67 The original FISA of 1978
included the requirement, and removal of the requirement seems a blatant
defiance of the Fourth Amendment text mandating that search warrants may
only issue upon a showing of "probable cause." 68 For this reason, the plain-
tiffs contended that the legislation was unconstitutional.69 However, the case
was never heard on its merits due to lack of standing.70
To show actual and imminent injury, plaintiff Scott McKay pleaded that
as a lawyer he represented several suspected international terrorists, such as
Khalid Sheik Mohammed.71 Among McKay's clients were suspected ter-
rorists formerly detained at Guantdinamo Bay, who had since been acquitted
of charges against them.72 Prior to 2008, the U.S. government had intercepted
about "10,000 telephone calls and 20,000 email communications" involving
one of McKay's clients.73 Knowing this, McKay believed that it was highly
likely the government would monitor his telephone communications with his
clients under the authority of the 2008 FISA amendment, but in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.74 Accordingly, to avoid violations of confidentiality,
McKay would not communicate unless a matter was urgent, and then he
would only communicate in person, which involved expensive and time-con-
suming travel arrangements.75 In a 5-4 ruling characterizing the injury as
63. See Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. at 1138.
64. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 549 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
66. Id. at 1144 (citations omitted).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1143; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. at 1142.
70. Id. at 1143.
71. Id. at 1156-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
74. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. at 1164 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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"speculative," the Court held that McKay did not meet the injury requirement
requisite for standing.76
Warrantless wiretaps are, by their nature, designed to go undetected.
Some may consider it a lesser problem if the victim is unaware, but "[i]f
anything, [the violation] is more offensive because the [victim] is completely
unaware of the invasion of privacy."77 Because the violation is clandestine, to
challenge the constitutionality of a congressional act that permits unconstitu-
tional violations of privacy, the challenger must rely on a showing of immi-
nent injury (rather than actual injury) in order to proceed to discovery, where
he or she may gather evidence to show actual injury.78 But the standing re-
quirements, as applied in Amnesty International, are so prohibitive that per-
haps nobody can satisfy them. After all, who is more likely to be the subject
of a warrantless wiretap than an attorney for suspects of international
terrorism?
If Scott McKay cannot show that violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights is imminent, it seems doubtful that anyone can without first having
concrete evidence. However, such proof was provided in a subsequent case
heard by the Second Circuit, American Civil Liberties Union v. Amnesty In-
ternational.79 That case was an action seeking to enjoin the NSA from further
collection of data. The plaintiffs in the case claimed to be actually injured
because they were Verizon customers and the Snowden leaks evidenced that
the NSA had violated their Fourth Amendment.80 The court held in their
favor that standing was conferred, because these plaintiffs "need not specu-
late that the government has collected, or may in the future collect, their call
records. To the contrary, the government's own orders demonstrate that ap-
pellants' call records are indeed among those collected as part of the tele-
phone metadata program."81 In other words, without a government
whistleblower, like Snowden, plaintiffs like these or Scott McKay have very
little chance of seeking redress for statutes that blatantly call for violations of
the Fourth Amendment.
Director Comey proposes that Congress restrict technology companies'
ability to distribute strong encryption capabilities. Proponents of this propo-
sal argue it conforms to the Fourth Amendment. However, if the plan does
violate the Constitution, courts will likely never have the occasion to rule on
the law. Under Amnesty International's standing requirements, the political
process may serve as the only means of protecting privacy rights. The Presi-
dent and all of Congress have sworn to uphold the Constitution. As the only
76. Id. at 1143.
77. Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967).
78. See Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
79. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
80. Id. at 799.
81. Id. at 801.
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line of defense, these elected officials would be derelict not to consider the
constitutional perspectives below. "Only by striking at all aspects of the
problem can privacy be adequately protected."82
B. To Regulate Against the Distribution of Strong Encryption Would
Directly Violate The Fourth Amendment
"'It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his inde-
feasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property' that
violates the Fourth Amendment."83
1. History and Text of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment's text "reflect[s] the determination of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation should for-
ever 'be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' from intrusion
and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled authority of a general war-
rant."84 In 1761, nearly twenty years before drafting the Fourth Amendment's
precursor, as a young lawyer, John Adams took courtroom notes while James
Otis argued against general warrants and proposed an alternative model to
measure the propriety of such intrusions.85 Throughout his life, John Adams
"repeatedly referenced the importance of Otis's arguments." 86
The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket
authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in vio-
lation of the British tax laws. They were denounced by James Otis
as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
was found in an English law book," because they placed "the lib-
erty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." The historic
occasion of that denunciation, in 1761 at Boston, has been charac-
terized as "perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated
the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother
country." "Then and there," said John Adams, "then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims
82. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 549 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
83. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Pri-
vacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307 (1998) (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (internal quotations omitted).
84. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
85. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth




of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born."87
During the American Revolution, the widely held disdain for the abu-
sive use of general warrants culminated in many state governments adopting
laws protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.88 "Those protec-
tions, embodied in the constitutions of the various states after declaring their
independence, typically addressed only abuses associated with general war-
rants." 89 However, the Massachusetts Constitution, drafted by John Adams in
1779, offered a different model.90 Rather than merely abolish the practice of
general warrants, John Adams's provision preceded with the specific declara-
tion of the right to be secure. 91 Article 14 provided:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all
his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right,
if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by
oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a civil of-
ficer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied
with a special designation of the person or objects of search, ar-
rest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases,
and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.92
"Although Adams consulted other state constitutions, Article 14 had
significant innovations: the words 'secure' and 'unreasonable' to define the
quality and scope of the right protected were new to search and seizure provi-
sions."93 Moreover, rather than merely prohibiting general warrants, the first
sentence justified the prohibition by articulating the underlying right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.94 Although James
Madison is credited with drafting the Fourth Amendment, he adopted Ad-
ams's unique model as the format.95
There is consensus among historians that general warrants were the spe-
cific target of the Fourth Amendment.96 Arguing the necessity of the Fourth
87. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 481-82 (emphasis added).
88. Clancy, The Framers' Intent, supra note 83, at 1027.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1028.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Clancy, The Framers' Intent, supra note 83, at 1028.
95. Id. at 1029.
96. Id. at 1046.
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Amendment before the House of Representatives, James Madison asserted
that because the Federal government may reasonably consider general war-
rants "necessary and proper" to carry its powers into execution, general war-
rants must be constitutionally forbidden.97 While his aim was to forbid
general warrants, Madison chose Adams's abstract method for doing so, cop-
ying almost verbatim the essential elements of Adams's declaratory state-
ment, declaring first, the broad right of the people to be "secure," and then
particularly against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.98 This format per-
sisted through final form and harmonizes with the view that "the framers
intended not only to prohibit the specific evils of which they were aware but
also, based on the general terms they used, to give the Constitution enduring
value beyond their own lifetimes."99 In final form:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.1oo
2. Development of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free soci-
ety. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' . . . ."lol While
the text and history of the Fourth Amendment show intention to protect the
broad right to be "secure," its specific prohibition-against unreasonable
searches and seizures-may seem like the only justiciable manifestation of a
violation of the right to be secure. Indeed, a review of cases implicating the
Fourth Amendment suggests that before there can be a violation there must
be an actual search or seizure. And common explanations of the Amendment,
like the one found at the U.S. Courts' website, suggest its purpose is to "pro-
tect[ ] people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment."102 Both lines of evidence indicate the generally accepted principle that




99. Id. at 988.
100. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
101. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
102. What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us
courts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-out
reachlactivity-resources/what-does-0 (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
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If there has been a search or seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis then
turns on whether the search or seizure was lawful. A violation requires that
"the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place."1 03 To establish that a legitimate
expectation of privacy exists involves two inquiries: there must first be
shown "a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and second,
that the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable." 104
Upon establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy, "[a]s the text of
the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutional-
ity of a governmental search is reasonableness." 0 5 Warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable and "subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions."106 Even with proper procedure, the
reasonableness of a search and seizure depends upon balancing, "on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests."107 To be reasonable, a search usually requires "some
quantum of individualized suspicion."108
3. FBI Director Comey Tailored his Plan to Circumvent Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence
At first blush, the plan proposed by FBI Director Comey seems, for
three reasons, a clever circumvention of the Fourth Amendment. First, under
the plan, encrypted content would purportedly only be searched under lawful
conditions.109 Director Comey says, "[i]n the past, conducting electronic sur-
veillance was more straightforward. We identified a target phone being used
by a bad guy, with a single carrier. We obtained a court order for a wiretap,
and, under the supervision of a judge, we collected the evidence we needed
for prosecution." 10 Presumably, the suggested "front door" key is to be used
only for conducting these types of lawful searches-reasonable, warranted
103. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
104. United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1998) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
107. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
108. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 674 (1995) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Comey, supra note 1.
110. Id.
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searches. Although, if abused, a plaintiff would likely lack proof and even
the ability to discover evidence to seek redress."]
Second, rather than suggesting a back door, Director Comey "want[s] to
use the front door, with clarity and transparency."1l2 The figurative distinc-
tion between front and back door seems to preempt any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, a requisite element of an unlawful search and seizure.113 For
example, a Fourth Amendment claim could not prevail when the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that a university professor had no reasonable expectation of privacy
on his office computer because the university had a computer and internet
usage policy that allowed the employer a right of access on a need to know
basis.114 Accordingly, no reasonable expectation of privacy would exist if the
FBI and technology companies publicize that they are able-and contract for
the ability-to access information stored and transmitted using electronic de-
vices. With no reasonable expectation of privacy, the government may not
even need a warrant to lawfully search the devices. However, there would
seem an unacceptable irony if the only reason one had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy is because the government proscribed measures to attain
privacy.
Third, under the plan, technology companies, not the government, might
routinely and incidentally "seize" encrypted information transmitted through
their systems. However, the government should only search the information
when it is properly warranted. Accordingly, even if a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed, the government would have had no part in either seizing
or searching until after complying with proper procedure. Of course, if the
government were also seizing and searching without proper judicial over-
sight, the public would have no way of knowing. Assuming no abuse occurs,
Director Comey's plan appears, at first glance, to comply with the Fourth
Amendment. In practice, electronics users would have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy that demands a warrant for search. Seizing of information
would routinely be performed by technology companies that are not re-
strained by the Fourth Amendment, and government searches would be per-
formed only after obtaining unnecessary warrants that serve primarily to
portray propriety.
4. Careful Consideration Indicates Banning the Distribution of
Encryption Technology is a Blatant Violation of the
Fourth Amendment
A cursory review might suggest that Director Comey's plan complies
with the Fourth Amendment's legal requirements, but a deeper review of the
text and the Framers' intent reveals otherwise. The cases forming Fourth
111. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
112. Comey, supra note 1.
113. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
114. United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Amendment jurisprudence deal almost entirely with searches and seizures
actually performed. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to conclude that an actual
search or seizure is required to violate the Fourth Amendment.
The plain language of the Fourth Amendment text protects the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right "shall not be
violated." 15 Now, just as at the time of drafting, it may be difficult to con-
template a circumstance in which a violation occurs without an actual search
and seizure. Notwithstanding, however, the history of its drafting shows the
Framers chose the specific language to protect even against uncontemplated
violations of the broader right to be "secure."16
"Adams and his contemporaries repeatedly used the concept of 'secur-
ity' to describe the quality of the right protected as to each person's life,
liberty, and property."117 As a young lawyer sitting in on the arguments of
James Otis, Adams recorded Otis's assertion that general warrants violate
"fundamental Principles of Law . . . . A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his
House, as a Prince in his Castle .. . 1. 18 Otis's own account asserted that the
evil caused by a law permitting general warrants was that "every
hous[e]holder . . . will necessarily become less secure than he was before
[the law]."119 "Recalling Otis's argument many years later, Adams said in a
letter to William Tudor that Otis examined the acts of trade and demonstrated
that 'they destroyed all our security of property, liberty, and life.'"l20 Simi-
larly, in Madison's address to the House of Representatives, he "repeatedly
used variations on the concept of 'security' as the underlying concern."21
Hence, he asserted, "amendments were needed to 'expressly declare the great
rights of mankind secured under this Constitution.' "122 Madison argued that
the Bill of Rights would "provide those securities for liberty which are re-
quired by a part of the community" and that the amendments would "incor-
porate those provisions for the security of rights."23
Otis chose not to argue a particular injury caused by any particular
search or seizure. Instead, Otis argued broadly that every person was injured
by the law, itself, which prescribed general warrants-it was the law that
115. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
116. See Clancy, The Framers' Intent, supra note 83, at 988-89.
117. Id. at 1059.
118. Id. at 996.
119. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1059.
121. Id. at 1061; James Madison, Speech at the First Congress, First Session:
Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON at 230 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/ti-
tles/1937/Madison_1356-05_EBk..v6.0.pdf.
122. Clancy, supra note 83, at 1061.
123. See id.; Madison, supra note 121, at 374.
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made people "less secure."124 Even without a search, such a law indiscrimi-
nately violates the rights of all, specifically, the right to be secure against
such arbitrary and unreasonable searches.125 "[O]ur Revolution sprang" di-
rectly out of the violation of this right.126 The record of these events indicates
that the Framers intentionally drafted the Fourth Amendment to protect the
broad right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, rather than
merely prohibit general search warrants. Accordingly, notwithstanding ordi-
nary Fourth Amendment analysis, neither search nor seizure is required for a
violation to occur. Rather, as Otis argued, Adams expounded, and Madison
agreed, the denial of security is the true violation.
In light of the Framers' intent, Director Comey's proposal does not
withstand Fourth Amendment analysis. Director Comey's plan is nothing
more than a novel approach to make the people insecure against unreasona-
ble searches. Absent cases involving actual searches, no challenges exist re-
garding a violation of the right to be secure from unreasonable searches.
Similarly absent are cases challenging government violations of the Third
Amendment by quartering soldiers in private homes. But that there has been
no occasion to assert these rights does not make them any less substantive.
To the contrary, that these rights have survived centuries unviolated indicates
importance of the highest magnitude.127 Regulatory measures aimed at ex-
posing every person's communications and records to arbitrary search would
ordinarily seem too absurd to attempt. But because the use of technology has
advanced without the ability to secure privacy, banning encryption may seem
an acceptable measure to maintain the status quo. Careful analysis, however,
reveals that banning encryption violates the Fourth Amendment in a manner
so audacious that similar attempts have not been made since before the states
won their independence. Just as the government would never attempt to ban
the sale of lock and key diaries, paper shredders, matches, or safes-all of
which certainly interfere with reasonable searches-our government must re-
frain from proscribing the distribution of strong encryption technology. The
Fourth Amendment forbids such.
C. Court Test Will Likely Hold The Fundamental Right of Privacy
Includes The Right To Pursue The Security of Privacy
Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that government
may deprive no person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
124. See Clancy, The Framers' Intent, supra note 83, at 994.
125. See id. (emphasis added).
126. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
127. For more than two centuries, the United States has not attempted to quarter
soldiers in the homes of citizens, nor has its legislature attempted to outlaw
whispering, or the keeping of secrets. The rights implicated by doing so are so
basic and important that no official would dare violate them.
232 [Vol. XIX
Banning Encryption Technology
law." 28 The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from infringements by
the federal government and the Fourteenth by the state.1 29 Due Process re-
view, however, is the same for both Amendments.130
Due Process demands "more than fair process, and the 'liberty' it pro-
tects includes more than the absence of physical restraint."l31 In addition to a
procedural analysis, Due Process review includes a substantive analysis that
protects personal liberty from government actions.132 Certain liberties-fun-
damental rights-receive heightened protection against government interfer-
ence under the Due Process Clause.1 33
In addition to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights, some unenumer-
ated rights receive heightened constitutional protection. The liberty protected
by Due Process includes a broad fundamental right of privacy.134 Protected
privacy interests tend to fall into two categories: the "individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and the interest in autonomy in
making certain kinds of important decisions.135 The Court has not marked the
outer limits of the fundamental right to privacy.136 Precedent informs us,
though, that the right specifically includes the rights to marry, have children,
direct the upbringing of those children, marital privacy, use contraception,
maintain bodily integrity, and receive an abortion.137 The Supreme Court has
alluded that the right might include a broad fundamental right to informa-
tional privacy, but the Court has not specifically held such.1 38 Proscribing the
distribution of encryption technology would violate interests that fall within
the fundamental right to privacy.
The Court is careful when specifically defining fundamental rights to
avoid injecting its personal policy preferences into the Constitution where the
political process should govern.1 39 Accordingly, the Court specifically deems
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV § 1.
129. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
130. Id. ("To suppose that 'due process of law' meant one thing in the Fifth Amend-
ment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate
rejection.").
131. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
132. Id. at 720.
133. Id.
134. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
135. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
136. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385.
137. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
138. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147 (2011).
139. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
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rights as fundamental only by carefully describing the right, and only when
the right is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and traditions and "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed."140 Government may only infringe upon funda-
mental rights through actions narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest.141
1. The Privacy Right at Stake is Carefully Described as the
Right to Pursue the Security of Informational Privacy
The Framers drew heavily on the work of the philosopher, John
Locke,142 who asserted that the purpose of government is to protect individ-
ual life, liberty, and property. 143 Accordingly, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide that deprivation of these demands Due Process.144 In-
terestingly, however, when Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of In-
dependence, he changed the third prong, "property," to "the pursuit of
happiness."45 In the 2006 American film, The Pursuit of Happyness, Chris-
topher Gardner, in the story based on his life, questioned how Thomas Jeffer-
son "kn[ew] to put the pursuit part in there."146 He pondered, "maybe
happiness is something that we can only pursue."47 Whether a person can
attain happiness is far outside the scope of this comment. The distinction,
however, between an unalienable right to happiness and an unalienable right
to pursue happiness is illustrative of the care taken to describe the right at
stake through regulation of encryption-the right to pursue the security of
informational privacy.
Locke also coined the phrase, "pursuit of happiness," when he wrote,
"the necessity of pursuing happiness [is] the foundation of liberty."48 It logi-
140. Id. at 720-21. Sometimes, it seems that the Court requires a lower standard
before nominating a right as fundamental, but for the purpose of this comment,
the most stringent test will be used.
141. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
142. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 (2015) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
143. See Jo-iN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 87, at 59 (1698) (justify-
ing political society on the basis of a power that man "hath by Nature ... to
preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate"), http://socserv2.soc
sci.mcmaster.calecon/ugcm/3113/locke/government.pdf.
144. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV § 1.
145. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
146. The Pursuit of Happyness, Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt045492 1/quotes (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
147. Id.
148. Locke and Happiness, PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS, INC., http://www.pursuit-of-hap
piness.org/history-of-happiness/john-locke/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
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cally follows that when Jefferson replaced "property" with "pursuit of happi-
ness," he likely intended to artfully emphasize that the states were declaring
their independence due to loftier notions of liberty rather than mere property
rights. Regardless of Jefferson's reasons, the inclusion of the phrase provides
insight into the meaning behind the Liberty protected by Due Process. Happi-
ness is fleeting, and to suggest a guarantee of happiness seems an absurd
contradiction to the human condition. While few legal protections exist for
disruption of happiness (e.g., actionable torts for inflicting of emotional dis-
tress), the government surely need not narrowly tailor its actions, and only
for compelling interests, before upsetting individual happiness. Nonetheless,
Locke's liberty, at its most fundamental level, includes the right to pursue
happiness.
While privacy is certainly more attainable than happiness, information
intended to remain private is always susceptible to public exposure. Even a
whisper can be incidentally overheard, and once overheard privacy is lost.
"Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a
civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life
in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of
press." 49 Perhaps this explains the Court's reluctance to include the right to
private information within the fundamental right of privacy.150
The Court may fear that recognition of a broad fundamental right to
informational privacy might unacceptably protect even those communica-
tions intended to be private but somehow exposed through passive incidents
of life. All three Supreme Court cases that considered whether the fundamen-
tal right to privacy includes the right to informational privacy involved infor-
mation already exposed and known. In 1977, Whalen v. Roe considered
whether a New York law requiring doctors to provide the names and ad-
dresses of patients prescribed certain drugs violated their right to privacy.151
In the same year, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services considered
whether a right to informational privacy protected President Nixon's docu-
ments and tape recordings.152 Finally, in 2011, National Aeronautics & Space
Administration v. Nelson assumed a significant constitutional right to infor-
mational privacy but decided that background checks performed by NASA
would not violate that right even under the most deferential standard of
review.1 53
149. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
150. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977); Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562
U.S. 134, 138 (2011).
151. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
152. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429.
153. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., at 562 U.S. 147.
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In all three cases the Court discussed the right to informational privacy
through Bartnicki v. Vopper's "risk of exposure" framework. None of the
opinions, however, discuss the right in terms of the liberty to mitigate the risk
of exposure. To draw a subtle distinction, these cases consider rights in-
tended to protect information already exposed but not the right to prevent
exposure. The latter is the specific privacy right at stake under Director
Comey's proposal. It is the right to pursue the security of informational pri-
vacy-i.e. the right to whisper.
2. The Liberty to Pursue the Security of Informational Privacy
is Deeply Rooted in the History And Traditions of the
United States
Millar v. Taylor is the famous 1769 English case that established a per-
petual common law copyright by proclaiming, "[i]t is certain every man has a
right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases. He has certainly a right to
judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of
his friends."154 "The aim of [copyright law] is to secure to the author, com-
poser, or artist the entire profits arising from publication; but the common-
law protection enables him to control absolutely the act of publication, and in
the exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publi-
cation at all . . . ."155 Copyright law is designed to protect property rights, but
its application embraces the individual right to secure informational
privacy.156
The common law tort of nuisance protects the right to secure privacy
under the right of quiet enjoyment of property. Nuisance law condemned the
ancient practice of eavesdropping.157 Eavesdropping was indictable under
common law in both England and the United States.1IS While copyright and
nuisance laws protect property, the premise for both is that individual liberty
includes the right to secure informational privacy. Indeed, the common law
provides redress for violation of the right.
The law of agency requires individuals to pursue the security of infor-
mational privacy.159 Agents often have a fiduciary duty to maintain the confi-
dentiality of their principals. Agency law requires attorneys to "make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or
154. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769) (Yates, J.).
155. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 200 (1890).
156. See id.
157. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 168 (1769)). Eavesdropping was so named
after the practice of listening "under the eaves of houses or their windows, or
beyond their walls seeking out private discourse." Id.
158. 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 670 (1882).
159. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 395 (1933).
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unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a cli-
ent."160 The Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) sanctions failures in maintaining the privacy of medical records
and communications-HIPAA requires encryption.161 The privacy require-
ments within historical agency law and its modem developments demonstrate
that the right to pursue the security of informational privacy is deeply rooted
in the history and tradition of U.S. jurisprudence.
In addition to the ample evidence in legal history, the right to pursue the
security of informational privacy is so self-evident that to suggest otherwise
seems absurd. Perhaps this is why opponents of encryption seek such a
roundabout method of restricting its usage. Perhaps they fear that the public
would never tolerate direct proscription of encryption-much like the public
might not tolerate a direct proscription of mathematics or behind-closed-
doors meetings.
3. The Right to Pursue the Security of Informational Privacy is
so Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty that
Neither Justice nor Liberty Would Exist if the
Right were Sacrificed
In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas wrote for the majority and
held that unenumerated fundamental rights are an articulation of rights found
within the "penumbra" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights.162 The lasting
test, however, came from Justice Harlan's concurrence. Justice Harlan rea-
soned that the Due Process clause "stands . . . on its own bottom."63 When
determining whether a right is fundamental, one inquiry is whether the right
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."164 In accordance with this
view, the Court has held that "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' . . . ."165
While Justice Harlan disagreed with the amorphous penumbra-and-ema-
nations test, he agreed that the "relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to
160. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (1983).
161. See Sarah S. Mir, HIPAA Privacy Rule: Maintaining the Confidentiality of
Medical Records, Part I A Detailed Look at the Evolution of HIPAA Privacy
and How It Impacts Those It Touches, 13 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 6
(2011).
162. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
163. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights."66 Accordingly, both
Justices found a fundamental right to privacy implicit within the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.167 For similar reasons, the concept of ordered
liberty must also include the right to pursue the security of informational
privacy.
a. The First Amendment Suggests the Fundamental Right to
Privacy Includes the Right to Pursue the Security of
Informational Privacy
"At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expres-
sion, consideration, and adherence."68
The First Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. . . . That is because speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government. . . . Accordingly, speech on public issues occupies
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection.169
Personal privacy also includes "the interest in fostering private
speech."70 "Privacy of communication is an important interest .... Moreo-
ver, the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a
chilling effect on private speech."171
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if
citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or
suspicion that one's speech is being monitored by a stranger, even
without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting
effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive
ideas. 172
The plan advocated by FBI Director Comey would place a heavy burden
on citizens seeking private communication. Knowledge that electronic com-
munications are subject to unintended exposure would have a chilling effect
on all private communications, even those communications that make up the
166. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
167. See id.
168. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 553 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
171. Id. at 532-33.
172. Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
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very essence of self-government. Whether by whispering or encrypting, the
rationale behind the First Amendment's protection of speech suggests the
right to pursue informational privacy is so implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty that neither justice nor liberty could exist if it was sacrificed.
b. The Fourth Amendment Suggests the Fundamental Right to
Privacy Includes the Right to Pursue the Security of
Informational Privacy
The Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain
kinds of governmental intrusion."l73 It provides that people are to be "secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures."174 In defining Fourth Amendment privacy rights, early Ameri-
can jurisprudence extended protection only to physical intrusion of physical
things and locations, such as homes and actual papers.1 75 Before the advent
of telephonic and electronic eavesdropping, this body of law served as a
workable protection of Fourth Amendment rights. However, the physical
limitations proved insufficient as technological advancements enabled
searches and seizures without physical intrusion.
In 1967, Katz v. United States considered whether law enforcement's
warrantless use of an electronic listening device attached to the outside (as
opposed to inside) of a telephone booth constituted a search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.176 Precedent suggested that a search
warrant was unnecessary because the listening device did not physically pen-
etrate the telephone booth.177 Citing to its own opinion authored only six
years prior, the Supreme Court broadened Fourth Amendment protection and
held that the Fourth Amendment "governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard with-
out any technical trespass . . . ."178 The Court departed from precedent by
extending Fourth Amendment protection to non-physical things, such as con-
versations and forgoing a requirement that the invasion be physical in na-
ture.1 79 Accordingly, the unwarranted recording violated the Fourth
Amendment. 180
173. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
175. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 349.
177. Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. at 359.
180. Id.
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In arriving at this holding, the Court articulated the proper perspective
of the Fourth Amendment: "[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."8
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.182
Thus, whether the Fourth Amendment protects a person's privacy may
turn on whether the person subject to search or seizure affirmatively sought
to preserve privacy. The rule implies that deeply rooted within our concept of
ordered liberty exists the individual right to pursue the security of informa-
tional privacy. Absent this right, the Fourth Amendment would serve frivo-
lously to secure only those who happened upon privacy. Banning or
weakening encryption will place a broad and heavy burden on the exercise of
this right.
c. The Fifth Amendment Suggests the Fundamental Right to
Privacy Includes the Liberty to Pursue the Security of
Informational Privacy
Under the Fifth Amendment, no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."83 The privilege against self-
incrimination "is so fundamental to our system" that "if a person in custody
is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and
unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent."84 Moreover, the
privilege demands informing the accused of "the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires."85 The detained must be per-
mitted to confer with counsel, in private.186
The privilege against self-incrimination "has come rightfully to be rec-
ognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a right to a private en-
clave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy."1 87 Our concept of ordered liberty requires the guarantee of the
privilege to not self-incriminate. Implicit within the privilege is the right to
pursue the security of informational privacy. For the accused, this right
181. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
182. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 479.
186. Id. at 485.
187. Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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manifests itself through the right to remain silent and the guarantee of private
conference with counsel. Neither justice nor liberty could be done if the un-
derlying right to seek to preserve privacy were sacrificed.
4. Banning the Distribution of Strong Encryption will not
Withstand Strict Scrutiny
With little exception, under strict scrutiny, the government may only
infringe upon fundamental rights to serve "compelling" governmental ends,
and then only by means "narrowly tailored" to further those ends.88 "[O]ne
of the most quoted lines in legal literature" is attributed to legal scholar,
Gerald Gunther, who observed that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact."l89
The two-pronged strict scrutiny analysis begins with a determination of
the ends sought, which must be compelling.190 "'[T]he Court uses compel-
ling in the vernacular to describe [the] societal importance' of the govern-
ment's reasons for enacting the challenged law."191 "Because the government
is impinging upon someone's core constitutional rights, only the most press-
ing circumstances can justify the government action."92 Broadly speaking, a
compelling government interest exists in matters of great importance are at
stake, such as national security, public safety, and crime investigation. How-
ever, strict scrutiny may require a strong nexus between the specific end of
performing proper searches and seizures and the general ends of national
security and public safety. Nonetheless, this comment assumes the govern-
ment interest is compelling.
The second prong considers whether the means are narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling interest.193 Narrow tailoring requires that the law cap-
ture within its reach the "least restrictive" means available to pursue those
188. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). But see Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (introducing an un-
due burden test that departs somewhat from traditional strict scrutiny).
189. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing
Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther: The Man and the Scholar, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 643, 645 (2002).
190. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
191. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (quot-
ing HANS A. LINDE, WHO MUST KNow WHAT, WHEN, AND How: THE Sys-
TEMIC INCOHERENCE OF "INTEREST" SCRUTTNY, IN PULIC VALUES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 221 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993)).
192. Id.; see Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (opining that constitu-
tional rights are not absolutes and that "[p]ressing public necessity" may war-
rant interference).
193. Winkler, supra note 191, at 800.
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ends.194 This is where government actions often fail strict scrutiny review.
Banning the distribution of encryption technology is not "narrowly tailored"
because it is too broad.
The Comey plan heavily burdens access to privacy-enabling technology.
Doing so will, no doubt, aid law enforcement investigations, but by broadly
denying a most basic right.
If a statute were to authorize placing a policeman in every home
or office where it was shown that there was probable cause to
believe that evidence of crime would be obtained, there is little
doubt that it would be struck down as a bald invasion of privacy
.... I can see no difference between such a statute and one au-
thorizing electronic surveillance, which, in effect, places an invisi-
ble policeman in the home. If anything, the latter is more offensive
because the homeowner is completely unaware of the invasion of
privacy.195
The statute considered in Berger authorized surveillance where less than
probable cause existed to believe that any particular offense had occurred.1 96
The statute did not withstand strict scrutiny because "the language of New
York's statute is too broad in its sweep resulting in a trespassory intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area."197 Rather than directly intruding into
private areas, banning the distribution of encryption technology will prohibi-
tively burden ordinary citizens in their pursuit to secure privacy. Rather than
targeting a few with probable cause, the plan openly invades the privacy
rights of all, by creating a "front door" for the government to surveil all
electronic information. The untailored proposal infringes upon everyone; its
breadth would eviscerate privacy rights.
IV. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATION
Our nation's history and traditions suggest that mistrust of government
is more than ample justification to seek informational privacy. Beyond trust,
however, the government should promote, rather than discourage, the use of
strong encryption-weakening encryption will cause more crime and na-
tional security threats than it rectifies.
194. Id. at 800-01; see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by show-
ing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state
interest.").
195. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 59.
197. Id. at 44.
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A. Weakening Encryption Will Lead to More Crime
Informational insecurity wreaks havoc on modern society. Just two
months before Director Comey's speech, Apple suffered a security breach
where hackers accessed and released private images of several female celeb-
rities.198 "Private images of Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, Rihanna and
others were widely distributed on the internet . . . in the largest celebrity
hacking scandal in history."99 Victims who had their private photos pub-
lished on the internet threatened to sue Google for damages of over $100
million for "profiting from the victimization of women."200 Within hours,
Google scrambled to remove links to "tens of thousands of pictures" pub-
lished through no fault of their own.201
In April 2015, as a result of a Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) investigation of consumer data breaches, AT&T agreed to pay a $25
million civil penalty. 202 The "AT&T data breaches exposed about 280,000
U.S. customers' names and . . . Social Security numbers."203 The data was
targeted in order to unlock stolen mobile devices for sale on secondary mar-
kets.204 In response to the breach, Tom Wheeler, Chairman of the FCC said,
"[a]s the nation's expert agency on communications networks, the [FCC]
cannot-and will not-stand idly by when a carrier's lax data security prac-
tices expose the personal information of hundreds of thousands of the most
vulnerable Americans to identity theft and fraud."205
The year 2014 proved to be one of the worst for security breaches. A
string of attacks began in December 2013, when several news outlets re-
ported that hackers stole "40 million credit and debit cards and 70 million
198. Edwin Chan & Christina Farr, Apple Says Its Systems Not to Blame for Celeb-
rity Photo Breach, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-entertainment-photos-apple-idUSKBNOGX29D20140903.
199. Alex Hem & Dominic Rushe, Google Threatened With $100m Lawsuit Over
Nude Celebrity Photos, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014, 8:21 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/02/google-lawsuit-nude-celebrity-
photos.
200. Emily Smith, Hacked Celebs' Lawyers Threaten to Sue Google, PAGE Six (Oct.
1, 2014, 11:04 PM), http://pagesix.com/2014/10/01/lawyers-for-hacked-celebs-
sue-google-for-failing-to-removing-nude-pics.
201. Samuel Gibbs, Google Removes Results Linking to Stolen Photos of Jennifer
Lawrence Nude, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/technology/2014/oct/20/google-search-results-linking-stolen-
nude-photos-jennifer-lawrence.
202. Everett Rosenfeld, AT&T Data Breaches Revealed: 280K US Customers Ex-
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personal records" from Target stores. 206 Target ultimately agreed to pay $39
million to settle claims from the breach.207 Subsequently, hackers breached
Home Depot and accessed 56 million credit cards and 53 million email ad-
dresses.208 Similar breaches occurred at Kmart, Dairy Queen, and Albert-
sons.209 Additionally, JPMorgan Chase & Co. announced hackers accessed
information covering 76 million households and seven million small
businesses.210
These attacks impose huge costs on society. In June 2014, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank, esti-
mated that data breaches cost the world economy more than $445 billion
annually-or almost one percent of global income.211 President Obama cited
an even higher figure of $1 trillion annual economic cost resulting from data
breaches.212 These costs have elevated the problem of data security to high
priority for the world economy.
Despite growing security concerns, progress continues. Mobile device
users increasingly manage business and finances with their computers and
smartphones. 213 Major banks and investment brokers enable customers to
manage accounts through web-access and apps installed on mobile de-
vices.214 Both Apple and Google have implemented mobile payment func-
206. E.g., Tali Arbel, Top Business Stories of 2014: US Grows, World Slows, YA-
Hoo! FINANCE (Dec. 22, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://finance.yahoo.cominews/top-
business-stories-2014-us-grows-world-slows-185010987-finance.html.
207. Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $37 Million Over Data Breach, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news/companies/
target-data-breach-settlement/.
208. Arbel, supra note 206.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Report: Cybercrime and Espionage





213. See Consumers and Mobile Financial Services 2015, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. REs. SYST. (Mar. 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201503.pdf.
214. See MOBILE SoLUTIoNs, CAPITAL ONE, https://www.capitalone.com/online-
banking/mobile/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016); Seize Opportunity Anywhere with
Mobile Trading, TD AMERITRADE, https://www.tdameritrade.com/tools-and-
platforms/mobile-trading.page (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
244 [Vol. XIX
Banning Encryption Technology
tions on their smartphones, making it possible to pay at storefront points of
sale with just a mobile device.215
As technological progress continues, vulnerabilities grow. Given these
vulnerabilities, technology companies have responsibly made device security
a top priority by putting strong encryption as a default setting on mobile
devices.216 Technology companies cannot jeopardize security with a back or
front door (i.e. weaknesses) for criminals to attack. To do so would exacer-
bate an already enormous problem.
B. Weakening Encryption Will Lead to Greater National Security
Threats
Data breaches are not always profit-driven; there is a brand of hackers,
"hacktivists," motivated by political ends. On November 24, 2014, Sony Pic-
tures Entertainment (Sony) fell victim to hacktivists.217 Sony was preparing
to release the film, The Interview, a comedy depicting a plotted assassination
of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un.218 Threatening negative repercussions
should Sony release the film, these hacktivists-presumably North Korean
hackers-leaked numerous confidential Sony documents: employee ad-
dresses, social security numbers, performance reviews, and embarrassing
emails.219 The news media knowingly continued to propagate the illegally
obtained data, causing irreparable harm to Sony's reputation and business
relationships.220 Problematically, Sony may be without remedy against those
outlets due to First Amendment defenses.221 Accordingly, tightening security
to prevent future occurrences seems to be Sony's only available "remedy."
National security experts are concerned with greater threats involving
politically motivated data breaches. "A study conducted in April [2015] by
Symantec Corp., the world's biggest cybersecurity firm, found that com-
puter-system invaders attacked 43 percent of global mining, oil and gas com-
215. See Apple Announces Apple Pay, APPLE (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.apple.
com/pr/library/2014/09/09Apple-Announces-Apple-Pay.html; MasterCard
Powers Android Pay, Bringing Mobile Payments to Android Device Owners,
MASTERCARD (May 28, 2015), http://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/
mastercard-powers-android-pay-bringing-mobile-payments-to-android-device-
owners/.
216. See Comey, supra note 1.
217. Samuel C. Cole, Comment, You Took the Words Right Out of My Database: Is
There First Amendment Protection for Media Outlets Publishing Business Data
Stolen by Hackers?, 18 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 111 (2015).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 112.
220. Id.
221. See id. (presents a constitutional interpretation that allows protection, notwith-
standing common understanding).
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panies at least once" in the previous year.222 Experts fear that attackers, by
targeting these companies, are exploring the potential to create blackouts or
oil spills. 22 3 Given the interconnectivity of major military and industrial oper-
ations, very little imagination is required to envision horrific national security
incidents due to cyber security failures, even those from smart phone
breaches. Unsurprisingly, President Obama believes "[c]yber threats pose
one [of] the gravest national security dangers that the United States faces."224
America's economic prosperity, national security, and our individ-
ual liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace
and maintaining an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable In-
ternet. Our critical infrastructure continues to be at risk from
threats in cyberspace, and our economy is harmed by the theft of
our intellectual property. Although the threats are serious and they
constantly evolve, I believe that if we address them effectively, we
can ensure that the Internet remains an engine for economic
growth and a platform for the free exchange of ideas.225
Perhaps this is why the White House chose not to pursue anti-encryption
legislation. 226 Constitutional considerations aside, justifying measures to ban
strong encryption could pose an irreconcilable contradiction with stated ends.
C. The People of the United States Have Never Trusted Their
Democratically Elected Government with the Power
Suggested
Speaking to the Brookings Institute, Director Comey acknowledged,
"[t]his country was founded by people who were worried about government
power-who knew that you cannot trust people in power."227 Ironically, in
the same speech, he suggests, "the post-Snowden pendulum has swung too
far in one direction-in a direction of fear and mistrust."228 Appealing to the
crowd, he asked, "[a]re we so mistrustful of government-and of law en-
forcement-that we are willing to let bad guys walk away . . . willing to
222. Isaac Arnsdorf, Hackers' Favorite Target: Big Oil and All That Deadly Equip-
ment, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-06-10/hackers-favorite-target-big-oil.
223. Id.
224. Statement by the President on the Cybersecurity Framework, 2014 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 88 (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/02/12/statement-president-cybersecurity-framework.
225. Id.
226. James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the Sen-
ate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/threats-to-the-homeland.




leave victims in search of justice?"229 In the United States, the answer to
those questions has always been a resounding "yes!" Since its founding, the
people of the United States have vested their government with limited powers
precisely because they distrust.
The law provides numerous examples where society is unwilling to pay
with liberties the cost of convicting every criminal for every crime.230 Law
enforcement could convict more criminals without the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Likewise, unwarranted searches and
seizures would aid in criminal convictions. Indeed, "[a]t every level of our
legal system-from the Constitution,231 to our statutes, 232 common law, 23 3
[and] rules234 . . . -society has acted to preserve certain rights at the expense
of burdening law enforcement's interest in investigating crimes and bringing
criminals to justice."235 It should be no surprise that the people may wish to
continue in this legal tradition, a tradition that opposes legislation that would
trounce on rights fundamental to their liberty.
Director Comey is no doubt well intentioned. In his struggle to punish
crime, he wishes to leave no stone unturned. However, our Nation has never
given the sort of trust he proposes. That Snowden revealed instances of abuse
changes nothing. There is no "pendulum" of trust; the Constitution has al-
ways protected the right to encrypt.
V. CONCLUSION
Apart from recent history, searching a criminal suspect's communica-
tions has generally been an unrealistic possibility. Before technological ad-
vancements, individuals conducted almost all communications in private,
unsearchable contexts. Apart from written text, communications were undis-
229. Id.
230. Apple Inc. Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search and Opposition to Government's Motion to Compel Assistance, In the
Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KDG203,
No. 16-CM-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016), ECF No. 16, at 46 [hereinafter Apple
Inc. Motion to Vacate Order].
231. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (limitations on searches and seizures), amend.
V (limitations on charging; prohibition on compelling testimony of accused).
232. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (prohibition on prosecuting crimes more than five
years old); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010 (2014) (limitations on ability to intercept communications).
233. E.g., attorney-client privilege, spousal privilege, reporter's privilege, and
priest-penitent privilege, all of which limit the government's ability to obtain
evidence.
234. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (limitations on use of character evidence); FED. R.
EvID. 802 (limitations on use of hearsay).
235. Apple Inc. Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 230, at 46.
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coverable. As society increasingly relies on technology to communicate, the
government's ability to search and surveil has substantially expanded.
Law enforcement has become accustomed to heightened search abilities
in this era coined "the golden age of surveillance."236 People are increasingly
communicating via mediums that travel through public channels. For conve-
nience, a great percentage of the population carries devices that track many
details of their life: conversations, finances, friends, calendars, and even lo-
cation. As a result, law enforcement officials have grown accustomed to new
investigation capabilities not possible just several decades prior; they may
even feel entitled to these abilities.
That people have sacrificed some privacy for convenience does not
mean they have waived their constitutional rights. Just as technological ad-
vancements created the "golden age of surveillance," further advancements
are now serving to restore privacy. Encryption reduces some capabilities re-
cently enjoyed by law enforcement, and this development frustrates those
tasked with investigating crime and securing the nation. Nonetheless, it is the
right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures and
to pursue the security of their informational privacy.
Aside from the constitutional right to encrypt, efforts to prevent the use
of encryption, while well-meaning, seem ill-considered. Financial crimes in-
volving technological security breaches result in enormous economic loss;
encryption is the best means to combat these crimes. Cyber threats pose one
of the greatest dangers to our national security; encryption serves to defend
against these threats. To hinder the use of encryption will likely cause more
harm than it helps.
Given the revelations made by Edward Snowden along with the unat-
tainable standing requirements to challenge Fourth Amendment violations,
many individuals perceive unlawful searches to be widespread, yet entirely
un-redressable. Encryption, accordingly, may serve as the only means of se-
curing fundamental constitutional rights involving informational privacy.
This comment urges discontinuation of attempts to stifle the use of strong
encryption. "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."237
236. See Peter Swire, The Golden Age of Surveillance, SLATE (July 15, 1015, 4:12
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2015/07/encryp
tionbackdoorsaren-tnecessary-we realready-in-a-golden-age-of.html.
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